17 ideas
| 18491 | The idea of 'making' can be mere conceptual explanation (like 'because') [Künne] |
| 13134 | We negate predicates but do not negate names [Westerhoff] |
| 13124 | Categories can be ordered by both containment and generality [Westerhoff] |
| 13117 | How far down before we are too specialised to have a category? [Westerhoff] |
| 13116 | Maybe objects in the same category have the same criteria of identity [Westerhoff] |
| 13118 | Categories are base-sets which are used to construct states of affairs [Westerhoff] |
| 13125 | Categories are held to explain why some substitutions give falsehood, and others meaninglessness [Westerhoff] |
| 13126 | Categories systematize our intuitions about generality, substitutability, and identity [Westerhoff] |
| 13130 | Categories as generalities don't give a criterion for a low-level cut-off point [Westerhoff] |
| 13131 | The aim is that everything should belong in some ontological category or other [Westerhoff] |
| 13123 | All systems have properties and relations, and most have individuals, abstracta, sets and events [Westerhoff] |
| 13115 | Ontological categories are like formal axioms, not unique and with necessary membership [Westerhoff] |
| 13119 | Categories merely systematise, and are not intrinsic to objects [Westerhoff] |
| 13135 | A thing's ontological category depends on what else exists, so it is contingent [Westerhoff] |
| 13129 | Essential kinds may be too specific to provide ontological categories [Westerhoff] |
| 4760 | Belief aims at knowledge (rather than truth), and mere believing is a kind of botched knowing [Williamson] |
| 19512 | Don't analyse knowledge; use knowledge to analyse other concepts in epistemology [Williamson, by DeRose] |